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Abstract
Background: Results-based financing (RBF) has been introduced in many countries across Africa and a growing
literature is building around the assessment of their impact. These studies are usually quantitative and often silent
on the paths and processes through which results are achieved and on the wider health system effects of RBF. To
address this gap, our study aims at exploring the implementation of an RBF pilot in Benin, focusing on the
verification of results.
Methods: The study is based on action research carried out by authors involved in the pilot as part of the agency
supporting the RBF implementation in Benin. While our participant observation and operational collaboration with
project’s stakeholders informed the study, the analysis is mostly based on quantitative and qualitative secondary
data, collected throughout the project’s implementation and documentation processes. Data include project
documents, reports and budgets, RBF data on service outputs and on the outcome of the verification, daily activity
timesheets of the technical assistants in the districts, as well as focus groups with Community-based Organizations
and informal interviews with technical assistants and district medical officers.
Results: Our analysis focuses on the actual practices of quantitative, qualitative and community verification. Results
show that the verification processes are complex, costly and time-consuming, and in practice they end up differing
from what designed originally. We explore the consequences of this on the operation of the scheme, on its potential
to generate the envisaged change. We find, for example, that the time taken up by verification procedures limits the
time available for data analysis and feedback to facility staff, thus limiting the potential to improve service delivery.
Verification challenges also result in delays in bonus payment, which delink effort and reward. Additionally, the limited
integration of the verification activities of district teams with their routine tasks causes a further verticalization of the
health system.
Conclusions: Our results highlight the potential disconnect between the theory of change behind RBF and the actual
scheme’s implementation. The implications are relevant at methodological level, stressing the importance of analyzing
implementation processes to fully understand results, as well as at operational level, pointing to the need to carefully
adapt the design of RBF schemes (including verification and other key functions) to the context and to allow room to
iteratively modify it during implementation. They also question whether the rationale for thorough and costly verification
is justified, or rather adaptations are possible.
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Background
Results-based financing (RBF), also called Performance-
Based Financing or Pay for Performance [1], is increas-
ingly being piloted and implemented at national level in
numerous countries across sub-Saharan Africa, and it is
the subject of much interest and debate in terms of the
assumptions on which it is based as well as its potential
impact to improve health outcomes [2–4]. Although evi-
dence on the effects of RBF was considered insufficient
until recently [5], a rigorous program of impact evalua-
tions mainly through randomized control trials (RCTs)
has been put in place for many schemes during the pilot
stage. This research has led to the production of an
expanding body of literature [6–10]. While RCTs and
other quantitative methods are useful to better under-
stand the effects of RBF on health worker motivation
and health outputs or outcomes, they are often silent on
the paths and processes through which these results are
achieved (beyond the hypotheses that they set off to
test), and on the wider health system effects of the
schemes [11]. As shown by Ssengooba et al. [12], it is es-
sential to couple those studies with detailed qualitative
or mixed-methods analysis to open the ‘black box’
between intervention and results, and assess how the
design and the implementation of the scheme affect its
potential impact on health outcomes and may have sys-
temic effects, thus defining the success of the interven-
tion. Not only implementation processes are known to
influence the outcomes of policies and interventions
[13], but the contextual features of the implementation
are key to understand such processes and their out-
comes, and deserve to be analyzed in depth [14]. For this
analysis, it is important to focus on those components
that critically contribute to the functioning of a scheme
and are key in the theory of change of RBF [15].
Despite the variety of labels used, the term ‘results-
based financing’ generally refers to schemes which entail
a transfer in resources when some form of performance
criteria is met [11]. In this paper, we make reference to
RBF schemes that focus on the supply-side, target bo-
nuses both to facilities and individual providers and
where payments are linked to the quantity of outputs
produced, modified by quality indicators [2, 11, 16, 17].
In such schemes, in practice, facilities sign a contract in
which the terms of the scheme are defined, and rules,
payments and sanctions established. Based on that, once
facilities have provided health services, they send an in-
voice to a purchasing agency (either an external imple-
mentation agency or a governmental body) in which
they request payment of the agreed (fee-for-service)
bonus for the sub-set of services provided which are in-
cluded in the RBF scheme. Such invoice is then verified,
and the quality of the healthcare environment also
assessed in order to calculate and make a payment to
the facility. The use of the RBF bonus is autonomously
defined by the facility staff, to both improve the working
environment and incentivize individual staff. Therefore,
as pointed out by Witter et al [11], RBF is based on the
assumption that individuals and organizations are moti-
vated to perform better by financial incentives, and that
better results can be promoted by linking payments to
desired outputs and encouraging decision autonomy and
entrepreneurial behavior at facility level. This is done by
revising institutional arrangements, clarifying roles and
tasks of each actor and establishing a set of explicit con-
tractual relations, which define rewards and sanctions,
as well as verification and enforcement mechanisms.
Obviously, the verification of results plays a key role in
such schemes and has indeed been termed a ‘corner-
stone’ of RBF programs [16]. Verification ensures that
services, for which a payment request (invoice) is made,
have been actually provided and that they are of good
quality [16]. The rational for carrying out a detailed veri-
fication of both quality and quantity of services provided
lies, first of all, in the practical necessity of calculating
the reward (i.e. financial bonus) accrued by facilities and
pay them a bonus in a transparent manner (which en-
hances their trust), as well as promptly and regularly
based on their effort and performance. It also entails the
opportunity for detecting frauds and for signaling to
providers a real threat of sanction in case of irregular-
ities, such as gaming on quantity of services, lowering
quality of services and reducing patients’ satisfaction.
Ideally, verification of results creates positive spill-over
effects also at system-level. If the verification procedures
include a patient satisfaction survey (as it is the case in
Benin), they could also be seen to play an important role
to channel the “voice” of the communities, which may in
theory allow for increased provider accountability [16,
18]. Finally, strong and reliable verification mechanisms
can improve the quality of the routine information
system by both contributing to a change in providers’
views on data reporting [2], and by providing a verified
comparison to assess it. Importantly, the availability of
information on performance allows for the possibility of
data analysis on a monthly or quarterly basis. It has been
noted that facility staff and managers appreciate and are
responsive to having detailed feedback on their perform-
ance [3]. This is even more useful if accompanied by
supervision (by district health authorities) and coaching
(by implementing agency) to identify the issues limiting
the facility’s performance as well as of strategies to ad-
dress them. The latter is another key element of RBF,
because with increased autonomy, providers need more
data and (at least initially) external support for decision-
making. Additionally, the involvement of district health
authorities in the verification procedures, accompanied
by their analysis of district-level data can reinforce
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governance and stewardship of the system and improve
the management of drugs, equipment and human
resources [19]. However, it is important to stress that,
the key role potentially played by the verification of re-
sults in RBF should not overshadow its costs. Indeed, as
argued for RBF overall [20], the verification processes
should be financially viable, so that their benefits out-
weighs the costs.
The aim of this paper is to present the case study on
the implementation of an RBF scheme, to highlight how
for pragmatic and operational reasons, implementation
may in reality move away from the ideal design and
practice, creating a disconnect with RBF’s theory of
change which can affect the scheme’s potential for re-
sults. In doing this, we focus specifically on a key func-
tion of RBF, that of the verification of results described
above. As a corollary, our analysis leads to a reflection
on how the verification function is operationalized in
practice, in terms of implementation challenges, finan-
cial and time costs involved and systemic consequences,
and whether it responds effectively to what it was origin-
ally envisaged. As a case study for our analysis, we look
at the RBF scheme implemented as a pilot program in
eight districts of Benin, which is further described in the
‘study setting’ section.
The choice of the RBF pilot project in Benin, and of
the verification of results carried out within it, does not
mean in any way that we consider the scheme, or that
component of the scheme, more ridden with problems
than others. Indeed, we believe that the situation we de-
scribe is quite common in other countries and for the
implementation of other schemes (i.e. differently de-
signed RBF schemes, as well as non-RBF projects). We
chose this case study because we have been involved, at
different levels, in the implementation of the scheme
and we believe that the practitioners’ views and experi-
ence, although rarely shared beyond reports at national
level, are a useful contribution to the academic debate.
The fact that that we are able to openly discuss these is-
sues testifies that the project implementation has been
an open process by all parties involved (Ministry of
Health and donor, in particular), where scrutiny and
self-reflection are encouraged in order to learn and im-
prove the scheme.
In the following sections of this article, we first
describe the features of the RBF pilot scheme in Benin
and in particular the design of the verification processes
which are in place at different level. After describing the
methods of this research, in the ‘findings’ section, we
turn to the verification procedures as implemented in
the field, and we examine those practices against the ori-
ginal design as well as against the rationale of the verifi-
cation and the potential positive effects at system-level
identified above.
Study setting and RBF design in Benin
The first RBF pilot effectively started in Benin in March
2012, with funding from the World Bank. Initially, it
covered about half of the facilities in 8 districts (zones de
santé) out of the total 34 of the country, and a popula-
tion of about 2,377,559 people (23% of the total popula-
tion) (Fig. 1). The focus of the program is on the health
facilities’ productivity and quality of healthcare, and to
assess its effectiveness an RCT was planned since its
inception and is still ongoing [21]. For the RCT, the
remaining facilities in the 8 districts were selected as
control and received funds not based on their perform-
ance. As of April 2015, RBF has been scaled up to 21
districts, with the support of the Global Fund and GAVI.
Fig. 1 Map of Benin highlighting the 8 districts were RBF was
initially introduced
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RBF design and verification of results
To ensure the management of RBF, a Project Coordin-
ation Unit was created within the Ministry of Health
(MoH), which is in charge of signing the performance
contracts with the providers, purchasing the health ser-
vices (i.e., establishing the list of services included in the
scheme and the corresponding bonus), and transferring
the payments to the facilities’ bank accounts. Alongside
the ministerial Project Coordination Unit, an implemen-
tation agency was hired to be specifically in charge of
technical assistance, coaching and verification proce-
dures. An international consortium, of which AEDES is
part, was selected for this role. The implementation
agency consists, in each district, of a team of 2-3 tech-
nical assistants, of which one physician with public
health experience and 1-2 additional staff according to
the number of facilities in the district. At national level,
one technical assistance oversees the implementation of
the scheme. Technical backstopping is provided by
AEDES in Brussels both with regular routine missions
and missions to address specific issues.
At the beginning of the project, performance contracts
were signed with facilities in both the control and the
intervention arm of the RCT (n = 188), indicating the
quantity and quality indicators included in the scheme,
as well as the amount of payment per indicator. Since
2014, quantity indicators include 28 at health center
level and 14 at hospital level (Table 1), while the quality
checklist is composed of about 100 items, mostly fo-
cused on the quality of the health service delivery envir-
onment and on the availability of tools and equipment.
Verification is performed in both arms, although only
the intervention facilities receive a payment based on
their performance. Each quarter, a ‘results validation
meeting’ is held at central level by the Project Coordin-
ation Unit, where the performance of the facilities is
reviewed as well as the verification procedures of the
implementing agency. Once validated, the performance
bonus is transferred to the facilities’ bank accounts by
the Project Coordination Unit. Every quarter, a staff
meeting is called in facilities to decide the use of funds.
Guidelines envisage that facilities must use a minimum
of 50% of the bonus to cover recurrent expenditures
(such as, drugs, equipment and cleaning materials, small
investments, etc.) and the rest (a maximum of 50% of
the total bonus) as staff bonus. The individual staff
bonus for each health worker is calculated based on
their cadre and seniority, as well as on their presence at
work for the period considered. Facilities also receive
other funds (beyond the RBF bonus) including a fixed
budget from the MoH (crédit delegué de l’Etat), user fees
from patients which are used to fund recurrent costs
and purchase drugs [22]. Hospitals are reimbursed for
the C-sections which they provide for free under the
current governmental policy. In some specific cases, they
may also receive reimbursements from health insurance and
support (in cash, or kind) from NGOs and associations.
Similarly to many other RBF schemes in Africa and in
particular the early ones in the Great Lakes region [16],
the verification of results for the Benin pilot is organized
along three main axes [23]. A first verification concerns
the quantity of services (among those included in the
RBF contract) provided by the facilities and is carried
out twice per quarter by the technical assistants of the
implementing agency at district level. It aims to confirm
the accuracy of the data reported by the facilities in the
monthly RBF declarations. In practice, the technical as-
sistants in the district visit each facility every month to
compare the numbers detailed in the monthly invoice
sent by the facility with those included in the facility
registries. It also includes a check of the standards of the
service provided. This means that if the service was not
provided according to the standards (e.g., the patient re-
ceives less than 4 ANC visits and not at the right timing
for the ‘ANC 4’ indicator), that particular service will not
be counted towards the monthly total and therefore not
paid for. Secondly, a verification is conducted to assess
the quality of the services provided, using a quality
checklist which was prepared drawing from the one used
in Burundi [16]. Quality verification is carried out every
quarter under the leadership of the District Health Man-
agement Team (DHMT - Equipe d’Encadrement de la
Zone Sanitaire in Benin). The DHMT staff (usually orga-
nized two or three teams including 2-3 DHMT staff
each) conducts the verification directly for health cen-
ters, by visiting each facility in the district and checking
the availability of equipment and materials against those
indicted in the quality checklist. Although consisting in
the same procedure, the quality verification in district
hospitals is carried out by peers (i.e. staff from another
district hospital). This is because some DHMT staff usu-
ally works in the local hospital and therefore would have
a conflict of interest in verifying their own service qual-
ity. In practice, therefore, each quarter, a team of five
from one district hospital is randomly assigned to visit
the hospital in another district and fill in the quality
checklist. In both cases, the implementation agency su-
pervises the procedures. Finally, a counter-verification or
community verification is envisaged to be carried out
quarterly by community-based organizations (CBOs).
CBOs are selected by the central Project Coordination
Unit among NGOs with a strong presence in at least
one of the pilot districts, which are independent, have
no connections with health facilities, have experience in
carrying out surveys and can hire enumerators, have a
bank account, and exist since at least two years. In those
districts, they contract enumerations to visit communi-
ties with the aim of tracing some of the patients who
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Table 1 Indicators included in the RBF pilot in Benin and corresponding payment to facilities
Health service Payment 2014 (FCFA) Payment 2014 (USD)
Health centres (HC) New case of curative consultation 350 0.71
New case of curative consultation for poorest in the community
(extra payment)
1,750 3.57
Growth monitoring visit (11-59 months) 420 0.86
Diagnosis and treatment of malaria in children 330 0.67
Diagnosis and treatment of malaria in pregnant women 655 1.34
Diagnosis and treatment of severe malaria in children 5,890 12.02
Diagnosis and treatment of severe malaria in pregnant women 5,365 10.94
ANC 1 3,500 7.14
ANC 1 for poorest women (extra payment) 2,800 5.71
ANC 4 3,000 6.12
ANC 4 for poorest women (extra payment) 3,000 6.12
Normal delivery assisted by skilled personnel 7,500 15.30
Normal delivery assisted by skilled personnel for poorest women
(extra payment)
6,000 12.24
Postnatal consultation 1 (7th-10th day after delivery) 3,500 7.14
Postnatal consultation 3 (42nd-45th day after delivery) 1,750 3.57
New users of long-term family planning (IUD and implant) 6,300 12.85
New users of short-term family planning 1,750 3.57
Emergency referral for delivery 3,150 6.43
Children having received BCG vaccine 875 1.79
Children having received pentavalent vaccine 700 1.43
Children fully immunized 3,000 6.12
Patient referral and arrival to hospital 1,050 2.14
Detection of TBC+ case 14,350 29.27
TBC cases treated and healed 15,000 30.60
Pregnant women detected HIV+ and initiated to ARV treatment 15,750 32.13
Patients on ARV treatment (first 6 months) 8,750 17.85
Children eligible to ARV having started treatment 19,250 39.27
Diagnosis and treatment of STIs 700 1.43
District hospitals Counter-referral by hospital of patients from HC 3,500 7.14
Diagnosis and treatment of malaria in children 330 0.67
Diagnosis and treatment of malaria in pregnant women 655 1.33
Diagnosis and treatment of severe malaria in children 5,572 11.36
Diagnosis and treatment of severe malaria in pregnant women 5,075 10.35
Pregnant women detected HIV+ and initiated to ARV treatment 17,500 35.7
Patients on ARV treatment (first 6 months) 12,250 24.99
Children eligible to ARV having started treatment 19,250 39.27
Dystocic delivery of a patient referred from a HC 17,500 35.7
Gynecological surgery 26,250 53.55
Detection of TBC+ case 22,750 46.41
TBC cases treated and healed 26,250 53.55
Diagnosis and treatment of STIs 1,750 3.57
Exchange rate (August 2014): 1 F CFA = 0,00204 USD
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visited the facility within the communities, and check (i)
their actual existence and that they received the service
as indicated, and (ii) their level of satisfaction with the
healthcare services. A random sample of the patients is
prepared by the implementation agency. Additionally,
CBO’s enumerators are also supposed to carry out un-
announced visits to the facilities each semester to assess
the waiting time and the quality of patient reception.
Methods
This study takes the approach and methods of practical
‘action research’. Action research is essentially “con-
cerned with generating knowledge about a social system,
while, at the same time, attempting to change it” [24]. It
usually aims to generate understanding and improve-
ments in practice, and is undertaken by and with those
who will take action to ensure such changes [25]. In our
case, the reason for choosing this approach lies is the
fact that the research was initiated as a reflective process
conducted in parallel to operational work with the aim
of identifying problems and challenges, and providing
practical solutions to them, carried out by individuals
working within the implementation team. Indeed, all au-
thors have worked at some point in time to provide
technical support to the RBF pilot scheme, although at
different degrees ranging from a brief involvement at the
beginning of the project (two weeks in 2012 for MPB
and OB), to a continuous support with several missions
from July 2014 to the present date for MA. Because of
our role with the implementation agency, we had access
to data, documents and information which were col-
lected for the daily management of the project, as well
as for the ‘documentation’ process which took place
alongside the implementation. This study makes use of
the quantitative and qualitative information collected,
both at central level in Cotonou and in the districts
where the RBF project is implemented, for the ‘docu-
mentation’ of the project, but, importantly, all informa-
tion has been fully re-analyzed for the purpose of the
present study.
Our participant observation during the project’s imple-
mentation and contextual knowledge helped shape the
research questions and the research design, as well as
provide information for our analysis and data interpret-
ation. In addition, to inform our analysis, we reviewed
the existing documents and published literature, both re-
ferring to the RBF pilot project in Benin (e.g., project
documents and technical reports), as well as to RBF the-
ory and practice in other countries, with a particular
focus on the verification function. Documents reviewed
include the published literature, as well as the grey lit-
erature available from RBF websites, such as the online
group of the Performance-Based Financing Community
of Practice in Africa1 and the RBF website of the World
Bank2. Finally, as detailed above, we make extensive use
of secondary data, collected for the day-to-day activities
and documentation of the project, which we re-analyzed
in anonymized form specifically for this paper. Second-
ary data include quantitative information, such as (i)
RBF data on service outputs (which are publicly available
from Open RBF3) and data on the outcome of the verifi-
cation procedures from 2012 to 2015, (ii) information on
budgets and financial costs, also from 2012 to 2015, (iii)
information on time use (in particular on verification
procedures) by the technical assistants working for the
implementation agency in the pilot districts. The latter
was collected through daily timesheets completed by all
the technical assistants (n = 20) from June to August
2015. Secondary qualitative data include the information
contained in a series of focus groups discussions (FGDs)
with CBOs (n = 5) and informal interviews with district
medical officers (n = 5) and technical assistants (n = 8),
previously carried out for the operational work. Given
the study approach, both FDGs and interviews took an
informal approach and were not recorded and tran-
scribed verbatim, but rather summarized in the form of
field notes [26], which were later analyzed, with refer-
ence specifically to the issue of verification. Similarly,
our participant observation was unstructured and obser-
vations fed into field notes used initially for documenta-
tion purposes and re-analyzed for this study. Qualitative
data were manually analyzed using a series of pre-
identified themes. These themes focused on the potential
challenges linked to the different elements of the verifi-
cation, and included: (i) workload for implementing
agency and DHMTs; (ii) analysis of verification data; (iii)
cost of verification; (iv) community verification proce-
dures; (v) selection and management of CBOs. For each
of these, we also focused on the consequences that they
have on key components of the project, which may
affect the underlying theory of change of RBF. Secondary
analysis was performed on quantitative data already
available to triangulate and further explore issues
emerging from the qualitative analysis. In particular, data
were used to calculate (i) outcomes of the verification,
(ii) technical assistants’ time use, (iii) delays between
service delivery, verification and payment, (iv) costs of
verification.
We are aware of the potential limitations of the meth-
odology of our research, which stem from the closeness
of our perspective with the subject of study. In order to
mitigate the possible issues, we took them constantly in
consideration when designing and carrying out the re-
search, by actively exercising reflexivity and openly
reflecting on our positionality as participant observers to
different extents [27]. Dialogue among the authors,
whose degree of involvement with the projects vary so
that both insider and outsider views are represented, as
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well as with others within and outside the project has
enriched our data analysis, findings and interpretations.
On the other hand, our position also bears the advantage
of allowing detailed knowledge of the context and the
implementation processes, including on challenges that
may be difficult to see by external observers, as well as it
provided us with access to data that may be otherwise
complex to obtain. Finally, we have been open among
ourselves and with those who provided us with com-
ments and reviews about the potential conflict of inter-
est, stemming from the fact that we are involved in the
implementation of the project (and therefore likely to be
interested in providing a positive imagine of it), as well
as producing research on it. We believe that the con-
structive critic that we move to the verification process
in our findings and discussion sections shows our impar-
tiality towards the project’s assessment and confirms our
objective (alongside that of our funders and of the Min-
istry of Health) of raising important operational issues
regarding RBF which are often overlooked in the theor-
etical literature and produce a rigorous account of them,
with the final aim of improving RBF schemes in Benin
and elsewhere.
Results
Outcomes of the verification procedures
First, we briefly present the outcome of the verification
process in terms of what were the results of the various
verification procedures at facility level. In terms of quan-
titative verification, for the duration of the project
(2012–2015), based on the analysis of Open RBF data,
we found that the discrepancy between service volume
declared by the facilities and verified data greatly varied
according to the indicator (from 4% as an average for
‘new users of family planning’ to 51% for ‘patient
referred to hospital’). For any specific indicator, the dis-
crepancy remain generally stable overtime, with some in-
dicators (such as, patients referred to hospital) more
prone to errors or frauds than others. We also found
that some facilities and districts were more prone to
higher discrepancies than others. Regarding the quality
verification, scores greatly varied between health facil-
ities. Thus, in the third quarter of 2015, these scores
ranged from 4% to 96% according to the health centers,
with an average at 68.7% and a median of 71.8%. During
the RBF project (between the first quarter of 2012 and
the last quarter of 2015), quality scores increased from
39.3% to 71.4% for health centers and from 52.4% to
84.9% for district hospitals. Last, we found that data pro-
duced by the community verification were less often col-
lected than originally envisaged and, as important, that
those data were not systematically analyzed. Partial ana-
lysis of the number of patients missing from community
tracing shows them between 12% and 47% during the
third quarter of 2013 (first community survey). However,
other data on patients’ satisfaction were not analyzed at
all so that aggregated figures are not available, while un-
announced visits to facilities were never carried out.
Implementation of the verification procedures
In any RBF project, data and analysis resulting from the
verification procedures allow not only detecting errors
or frauds, but also calculating payments. In a study per-
spective, the verification outcomes described above also
provide a first understanding of the verification proce-
dures and of their challenges. In this section, we look at
the implementation processes in order to explore how
the actual practice can differ from what was initially
envisaged.
From the reviews of documents describing the design
of the verification procedures (e.g., implementation man-
uals), it appears that the processes in place to verify the
services provided is complex and lengthy and relies
heavily on the implementation agency’s technical assis-
tants. Indeed, it emerged that, in the project design, the
implementation agency, through the technical assistants
at district level, plays a particularly important role in all
the three axes of the verification process. First, the
agency is fully in charge of the quantity verification; sec-
ond, through the supervision of the entire process it also
contributes to the quality verification under the DHMT
leadership; third, it organizes and supervises patient tra-
cing by CBOs. Additionally, implementation agency’s
staff is also in charge of data entering into the Open
RBF information system. And last, the agency is respon-
sible for payment calculations, which are then approved
by the Project Coordinating Unit in charge of making
the payment to health facilities. The long, complex and
time-consuming features of the verification processes
were also confirmed by the interviews with the technical
assistants of the implementation agency, during which
the issue emerged repeatedly and was a clear source of
frustration. In order to triangulate the qualitative infor-
mation on this point, we analyzed the timesheets filled
in by the implementation agency staff in the districts be-
tween June and August 2015. We found that verification
procedures take up 67% of their time, of which 46% for
quantitative verification, 26% to support the qualitative
evaluation and 18% to prepare and supervise the com-
munity verification carried out by CBOs. The remaining
time (10%) is spent on data entering and recording
(Fig. 2). Data from timesheets also show that verification
activities become particularly time-consuming after the
end of each trimester when all verification procedures
and payment calculations need to be carried out.
During the informal interviews, technical assistants at
district level not only vented their frustration concerning
the time spent of the verification procedures, but also
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described the consequences of it. They noted that the
time spent on verification yielded to a loss in the quality
of their work and that furthermore that it is done at the
expense of activities that they consider being more im-
portant and constructive and adapted to their skills, such
as data analysis, one-to-one coaching and comprehen-
sive feedback to providers. As a consequence, the lack of
time available for feedback to health facilities staff seems
to have important draw backs on the potential of RBF to
actually impact on facilities’ performance (previously
presented as one of the possible positive spill-over
effects of the verification and data availability).
Competition of time is not only an issue for the imple-
mentation agency’s staff, but was also raised as an issue
for DHMTs during interviews with the district medical
officers (DMOs). Under RBF, DHMTs are supposed to
lead the qualitative verification process as well as sup-
port in the elaboration of facilities’ business plans and
coaching of health facilities’ staff. However, as DMOs
stressed, aside the RBF-related duties, DHMTs have a
large number of other routine tasks to perform, such as
supervision, monitoring and routine reporting, for which
they are directly accountable to their hierarchy. As activ-
ities related to RBF are poorly integrated with those
activities, DHMTs happen to give a lower priority to the
RBF verification tasks. Moreover, RBF is often in direct
competition with activities such as those related to verti-
cal programs (e.g. meetings, training or national preven-
tion campaigns), that generally entail the payment of per
diems. While it is true that DHMTs also receive daily
allowances for RBF qualitative verification, our data on
payments show that the latter are generally of a lower
amount and less readily paid. This fact is likely to con-
tribute to DHMTs’ low motivation to be involved in
RBF-related activities. Additionally, DMOs also men-
tioned that sometimes their offices lack equipment (e.g.
vehicles) or commodities (such as fuel) to carry out veri-
fication activities. In either case, because of the DHMTs’
insufficient time or lack of incentives and resources, this
has resulted, in the Benin’s project, in delays in carrying
out the quality verification at facility level, with conse-
quent postponements of RBF bonus payments to facil-
ities (as shown by the analysis of payment delays below).
Additionally, the limited involvement of the DHMTs and
their incapacity to take real leadership in the verification
process hampers the potential positive effects of RBF on
the governance and stewardship at district level.
For what concerns the community verification proce-
dures, during the FGDs, the CBOs’ enumerators in
charge of it pointed to the challenges that they face in
tracing patients in communities, especially in the rural
areas of the northern part of the country, which requires
extensive travel. An additional challenge was pointed out
by the technical assistants during the interviews and
concerns the way the verification process is organized
and how incentives are set. Indeed, the technical assis-
tants observed that, while the CBOs that run the com-
munity verification are paid a fixed lump sum regardless
of the amount of work they effectively carry out (i.e.
number of patients traced), the hired enumerators are
insufficiently paid to cover their running costs and
therefore are not sufficiently motivated to carry out their
tasks effectively. Another frustration and challenge for
the technical assistants relates to the fact that, due to
the design of the contracts, CBOs are not accountable to
the implementation agency even if they are supposed to
be supported and supervised by it. As a consequence,
the implementation agency has greater difficulties to
enforce standards for reporting and scheduling. Another
important point raised is that CBOs recruited for this
task are in fact national NGOs, organized in a
hierarchical way, with headquarters in Cotonou. This
organizational feature raises questions about their actual
relationship with the communities whose voice they are
supposed to convey. Therefore, it seems that the system
could be potentially taken advantage by elites in the
Fig. 2 Proportion of time spent on different activities for implementation agency’s staff in the field
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capital rather than by preexisting local organizations,
reflecting the idea of a community-owned process and
representation.
Finally, during fieldwork, we noted that, once
community-based data are collected, there is little or no
analysis performed, and no sanctions are applied to pro-
viders based on the detection of frauds. Besides, in the
Benin’s RBF scheme, it was not planned to use patient
satisfaction for rewards or sanctions. This issue does not
only concern the community verification, but all the
components of verification, because of the reticence to
apply sanctions to the cases of over-reporting of number
of services provided. Through the review of reports and
minutes of the results validation meetings held in
Cotonou, we found that in many instances, an approach
based on dialogue was preferred to the direct application
of pecuniary sanctions. Importantly, the preference for
dialogue over sanctions not only weakens the power of
incentives, but also renders the verification process (and
the money and time spent on it) practically irrelevant.
By analyzing existing activity reports and payment
documents, we found that a critical consequence of the
complexity of the verification procedures as described
above, and of the challenges for its operationalization, is
the important delay of the payment cycle. The lag time
between the verification and invoice transmission were
also compounded by the lengthy procedures at national
level for the calculation and execution of the payments
to the health facilities’ bank accounts. Table 2 below
presents the delays between the invoice transmission at
the end of the verification procedures and the actual
bank transfers. It shows that delays can be as long as
eight months from service provision to payment. Once
again, in terms of the RBF theory of change, this issue
engenders a disconnect between the effort of the pro-
viders (reflected in the quantity and quality of services
provided) and the reward. As the link between payment
and performance becomes less evident, the potential of
the performance-contract to incentivize workers be-
comes weaker.
Costs of verification processes
By using the project’s budget data, our analysis was also
able to assess the costs of the verification processes. The
cost calculations presented below include only the finan-
cial costs (e.g., financial transactions that are a results of
the verification activities introduced by RBF) and do not
include economic costs (e.g., also the time spent by
DHMTs and implementing agency staff on verification),
nor the capital costs [20]. It emerges that, while about
1,936,075 USD were provided to facilities as RBF bonus
in the period between July 2013 and June 2014, in the
same period about 958,484 USD were spent for the veri-
fication procedures. This means that for each 1 USD
paid to the providers, about 0.50 USD were used for the
verification, of which 39% goes to the implementing
agency and 61% to the CBOs in charge of the commu-
nity verification.
Discussion
This paper aims at describing the implementation prac-
tices of an RBF scheme in order to show that the actual
practices can greatly differ from the ideal design and
therefore result in a disconnect with the theory of
change underlying RBF itself. Logically this may have
important consequences on RBF’s potential to generate
the envisaged change and on the local health system. To
demonstrate that, we use the case of the verification of
results in place in the RBF pilot in Benin. Our findings
specifically highlight three main points, concerning the
verification of results, but also more broadly at oper-
ational and methodological levels.
First, verification is known to be a critical component
of RBF and a key element in its theory of change, as it
should (i) ensure a transparent and timely payment to
providers, (ii) avoid fraud and provide a real threat of
Table 2 Delay between service provision, verified invoice transmission and RBF bonus payment
Quarter Quarter end Verified Invoice transmission Delay (months) Bank transfer Delay (months) Total delay (months)
Q2 2012 Jun-12 Sep-12 3.5 Nov-12 1.5 5
Q3 2012 Sep-12 Dec-12 3.5 Apr-13 3 6.5
Q4 2012 Dec-12 Apr-13 4.0 Jul-13 3.5 7.5
Q1 2013 Mar-13 Jul-13 4.5 Nov-13 3.5 8
Q2 2013 Jun-13 Sep-13 3.5 Dec-13 3 6.5
Q3 2013 Sep-13 Dec-13 3.5 Feb-14 2 5.5
Q4 2013 Dec-13 Apr-14 4.0 May-14 0.5 4.5
Q1 2014 Mar-14 Jun-14 3.5 Jul-14 0 3.5
Q2 2014 Jun-14 Sep-14 3.5 Jan-15 3.5 7.0
Q3 2014 Sep-14 Dec-14 3.0 Feb-15 2 5
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sanction, (iii) generate data which can be analyzed and
fed back to providers and managers, (iv) improve gov-
ernance and stewardship at district level, (v) channel the
voice of patients and communities. After the scrutiny of
the implementation practices in Benin, however, it
emerges that very few of these features are in place and
verification processes are ridden with challenges. In par-
ticular, the verification articulated along the three axes
as described seems complex and time-consuming, which
has consequences in terms of workload for actors at
local level (both of the implementing agency and
DHMTs), lack of data analysis and information feedback,
and delayed payments, and therefore in practice too
often ends up differing from what envisaged at design
stage. Importantly, we also find that the costs of the
verification, and in particular the cost of the community
verification, is high as compared to the funds disbursed
to the service providers.
These findings on verification costs, but also on lack
of adherence to design, payment delays and concerning
the specific challenges of community verification are not
dissimilar to those of studies carried out in other set-
tings. In Burundi, for example, a study [19] found that
verification activities make up 16% of the total costs of
the national RBF project and that verification costed
25-30% of the entire budget at pilot stage, when the
scheme was NGO-managed. The same study in Burundi
also stressed that the role of verification outcomes as
sanction for providers has a marginal impact on the
scheme, as sanctions are rare and partially applied, and,
similarly to Benin, data are still not fully exploited for
analysis and feedback [19]. The problem of delays be-
tween service delivery and payment of providers is also
common across RBF projects in different settings,
because of difficulties in the verification processes and/
or in the disbursement procedures. Such delays, that we
found for the case of Benin, have also been documented
in Sierra Leone [28], Nigeria [29, 30] and Uganda [12],
and have a critical impact on the potential for results as
they delink performance and payment. Regarding the
community verification, many of the problems pointed
to by our analysis in terms of costs and practical feasibil-
ity were also made in a debate among members of the
Community of Practice with reference to Burkina Faso
and other countries (DR Congo, Rwanda, Central
African Republic, and Haiti) [31]. In terms of the rele-
vance of the community verification, previous research
has highlighted the dangers of conflating community
verification with a form of community participation, as
the outcome of that verification only represents the
views of few users and CBOs lack the ability to enforce
real changes at facility level [32]. In Benin, this issue is
further compounded by the elite appropriation, as CBOs
are in fact powerful national NGOs which resort to
hiring staff (not necessarily from the communities) to
conduct patients’ tracing surveys.
Unsurprisingly, the challenges in the verification
process affects RBF’s potential for results and hamper
the hoped-for positive effects on the wider health sys-
tem, as envisaged by the underlying theory of change.
However, despite the challenges, verification is an essen-
tial element of RBF, especially at the beginning of the
program when actors were not yet familiar with the new
institutional arrangements in place as it ensures the
credibility of RBF with all stakeholders. As a conse-
quence, verification procedures cannot be simply
scraped away, but must be actively adapted to context to
make sure that they are in line with RBF’s theory of
change, as well as operationally feasible and financially
viable. In particular, there is the need to find a balance
between rigorous verification processes and their prac-
tical feasibility and costs in terms of financial resources
and time, which would be otherwise available for other
activities including to provide funds to providers. The
challenges we encountered in the implementation ques-
tion whether the rationale for thorough and expensive
verification is still valid, or rather other solutions and ad-
aptations can be proposed. Indeed, some of the issues
detailed in this article have been now successfully ad-
dressed in Benin through the constructive collaboration
between Project Coordination Unit of the MoH, the
main donor and the implementing agency. For instance,
given the cost of CBOs and lack of use of the data, com-
munity verification was suspended while a more
adequate procedure is being design. With reference to
other countries and organizations, a collection of case
studies, prepared by the World Bank, describes the veri-
fication procedures in a number of RBF schemes globally
and provides useful information on their results and the
implementation challenges [33, 34]. From that analysis,
as well as from our study, a strong argument in favor of
‘risk-based verification’ emerges. This refers to a verifica-
tion which is not systematic and comprehensive, but
focused on certain indicators (higher volumes, complex
indicators, higher payments) and certain providers (ran-
dom selection, higher volumes, performance outliers)
[34]. Additionally, future positive developments in the
verification may include the use of new technologies
such as use of IT devices to trace patients, such as mo-
bile phone surveys, as well as tablets for easier, more
rapid and cost-effective data recording and analysis.
Secondly, and broadening our first point, our analysis
shows that RBF should be carefully tailored to the con-
text in each of its operational components (including
verification, but also beyond it), and space should be
allow for iterative adjustments during the implementa-
tion, especially at pilot stage but also when scaled-up.
Such iterative adjustments will ensure that the RBF
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project’s operationalization is feasible and optimal, given
the local features and the available financial resources,
time and skills. This should avoid that the practical chal-
lenges create a complete disconnect between what is im-
plemented and the key elements underlying the rationale
and the theory of change of the RBF intervention. While
in the early years of RBF implementation, the focus of
most experts and practitioners has been on how RBF
should be designed, as such establishing a certain ‘ortho-
doxy’ for example through the PBF Community of Prac-
tice, in the last few years, the literature on the influence
of context and implementation on RBF results has been
growing and there is an increasing recognition among
researches and practitioners that the local challenges in
the operationalization of RBF must be taken actively into
account, both in the design of RBF, which should reflect
and be adapted to the specificities of the context, and in
the implementation, which should remain flexible and
adapted iteratively, especially at pilot stage [35].
Finally, from a methodological perspective, our study
confirms the importance of including in the analysis of
RBF interventions not only their end-point results
(whether service outputs or health outcomes), but also
the processes through which these results are achieved,
and in particular carefully scrutinizing implementation
practices to complement impact evaluations [12, 15, 28,
30]. It seems that RCTs often assume clear-cut design
and perfect fidelity in implementation which would
allow to clearly link results to specific components of
the intervention and test the correctness of its under-
lying assumptions. However, in practice, at implementa-
tion stage, logistics and practical questions, scarcity of
time and funds as well as local political economies and
cultural features often substantially modify the RBF’s de-
sign. As a consequence, the results of the impact evalua-
tions are difficult to interpret as a neat evaluation of the
theoretical mechanisms underlying the RBF intervention,
but rather must be explained with reference to the
implementation processes and the broader context [36].
Conclusions
This study illustrates, through the example of the verifi-
cation of results in an RBF pilot project in Benin, that as
practitioners, researchers, funders and policy-makers, we
should collectively pay more attention to the operational
components of RBF schemes. In RBF (as in any complex
health system interventions), “the devil is in the detail”
as some RBF experts like to say. Our study suggests that
there is a need to focus on the details of the design of
RBF interventions to avoid standardization and ‘copy-
paste’ approaches and better adapt it to the local con-
text, as well as on the details of the implementation to
make sure that it is feasible and effective, and ensures an
alignment with the underlying theory of change of RBF.
Moreover, the scheme should be regularly and iteratively
revised to guarantee the relevance of all its components
during the actual implementation phase.
Methodologically, we need to go beyond the exclusive
focus on the impact of RBF to look also at other ele-
ments. As stress by others, context and implementation
are key [30], and it is also critical to examine the conse-
quences of the RBF schemes as actually implemented on
the health system more broadly [11]. In this sense, we
believe that the views of the implementers and practi-
tioners in the field, although often limited to internal
documents and discussions and rarely reported in the
published literature, can provide useful insights and an
operational perspective which complements the more







AEDES: Agence européenne de développement et santé; ANC: Antenatal
care; ARV: Antiretroviral treatment; CBO: Community based organization;
DHMT: District health medical team; DMO: District medical officer; F
CFA: West Africa Franc (Benin currency); FGD: Focus group discussion;
GAVI: Global alliance for vaccine and immunization; HC: Health centre;
MoH: Ministry of health; NGO: Non-governmental organization; RBF: Results-
based financing; RCT: Randomized control trial; STI: Sexually transmitted
infection; TBC: Tuberculosis; USD: United States Dollar
Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank to the technical assistants of the implementation
agency, as well as the CBO staff and the district medical officers who
provided time, insights and expertise that greatly assisted the research.
Thanks also to Dr Akpamoli and his team at the Ministry of Health, and to
Maud Juquois and Ibrahim Magazi of the World Bank for their constant
support during the implementation of the project and with this research.
Many thanks to Dr Jean-Pierre d’Altilia and Dr Jean-Pierre de Lamalle of
AEDES for their precious feedback at different stages of this work, and to the
participants to the “Payment for Performance: a health systems perspective”
workshop in Dar-es-Salaam in November 2015, for their comments on an
earlier version of this study.
Funding
We gratefully acknowledge funding for the analysis and writing-up of this
study from the Fondation AEDES (http://www.fondation-aedes.org). The
funding body played no role in the study design, data collection and analysis
and in writing the manuscript.
Availability of data and materials
Quantitative data on service outputs are available from Open RBF (http://
www.beninfbr.org), other quantitative data and documents reviewed are
available from corresponding author upon request.
Authors’ contributions
MA, MPB and OB defined the research questions, designed the research and
reviewed the literature. MA carried out the analysis of secondary data. MPB
drafted the paper which was commented on and enriched by MA and OB.
All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Antony et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:204 Page 11 of 12
Consent for publication
Not applicable.
Ethics approval and consent to participate
Not applicable.
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Received: 30 September 2016 Accepted: 8 March 2017
References
1. Musgrove P. Financial and other rewards for good performance or results: a
guided tour of concepts and terms and a short glossary. Washington: World
Bank background Brief; 2011.
2. Meessen B, Soucat A, Sekabaraga C. Performance-based financing: just a
donor fad or a catalyst towards comprehensive health-care reform? Bull
World Health Organ. 2011;89:153–6.
3. Kalk A, Paul FA, Grabosch E. “Paying for performance” in Rwanda: does it
pay off? Trop Med Int Heal. 2010;15:182–90.
4. Ireland M, Paul E, Dujardin B. Can performance-based financing be used to
reform health systems in developing countries? Bull World Health Organ.
2011;89:695–8.
5. Witter S, Fretheim A, Kessy F, Lindahl A. Paying for performance to improve
the delivery of health interventions in low- and middle-income countries
(Review). Cochrane Collab. 2012;(3).
6. Basinga P, Gertler PJ, Binagwaho A, Soucat AL, Sturdy J, Vermeersch CM.
Effect on maternal and child health services in Rwanda of payment to
primary health-care providers for performance: an impact evaluation.
Lancet. 2011;377:1421–8.
7. Falisse J-B, Ndayishimiye J, Kamenyero V, Bossuyt M. Performance-based
financing in the context of selective free health-care: an evaluation of its
effects on the use of primary health-care services in Burundi using routine
data. Health Policy Plan. 2014;30:1251–60.
8. Bonfrer I, Van de Poel E, Van Doorslaer E. The effects of performance
incentives on the utilization and quality of maternal and child care in
Burundi. Soc Sci Med. 2014;123:96–104.
9. Huillery E, Seban J. Financial incentives are counterproductive in non-profit
sectors: evidence from a health experiment. Paris: Science Po, Department
of Economics - Working Paper; 2015.
10. Binyaruka P, Patouillard E, Powell-Jackson T, Greco G, Maestad O, Borghi J.
Effect of paying for performance on utilisation, quality, and user costs of
health services in Tanzania: a controlled before and after study. PLoS
ONE. 2015;10:8.
11. Witter S, Toonen J, Meessen B, Kagubare J, Fritsche G, Vaughan K.
Performance-based financing as a health system reform: mapping the
key dimensions for monitoring and evaluation. BMC Health Serv Res.
2013;13:367. http://bmchealthservres.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/
1472-6963-13-367.
12. Ssengooba F, McPake B, Palmer N. Why performance-based contracting
failed in Uganda–an “open-box” evaluation of a complex health system
intervention. Soc Sci Med. 2012;75:377–83.
13. Durlak JA, DuPre EP. Implementation matters: a review of research on the
influence of implementation on program outcomes and the factors
affecting implementation. Am J Community Psychol. 2008;41:327–50.
14. Luoto J, Shekelle PG, Maglione MA, Johnsen B, Perry T. Reporting of context
and implementation in studies of global health interventions: a pilot study.
Implement Sci. 2014;9:57.
15. Renmans D, Holvoet N, Orach CG, Criel B. Opening the “black box” of
performance-based financing in low- and lower middle-income
countries: a review of the literature. Heal Policy Plan. 2016;31(9):
1297–309. Advanced Access.
16. Fritsche G, Soeters R, Meessen B. Performance-Based Financing Toolkit.
Washington, DC: World Bank; 2014.
17. Bertone MP, Meessen B. Studying the link between institutions and health
system performance: a framework and an illustration with the analysis of
two performance-based financing schemes in Burundi. Health Policy Plan.
2013;28:847–57.
18. Soeters R, Habineza C, Peerenboom PB. Performance-based financing and
changing the district health system: Experience from Rwanda. Bull World
Health Organ. 2006;84:884–9.
19. Renaud A. Verification of Performance in Results-Based Financing (RBF): The Case
of the Burundi. Washington, DC: World Bank - HNP Discussion Paper; 2013.
20. Borghi J, Little R, Binyaruka P, Patouillard E, Kuwawenaruwa A. In Tanzania,
the many costs of pay-for-performance leave open to debate whether the
strategy is cost-effective. Health Aff. 2015;34:406–14.
21. World Bank. Benin - health results-based financing impact evaluation survey
2010-2011, baseline. Washington, DC: World Bank; 2014. Available at http://
microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2176.
22. AEDES/Scenafrik. Mission D’appui À L’utilisation Des Credit FBR et À
L’autonomie de Formations Sanitaires. Cotonou; 2015.
23. MoH. Document de Cadrage Du FBR Au Bénin. Cotonou: Ministere de la
Santé Publique; 2011.
24. Meyer J. Action research. In: N F, editor. Studying the organisation and
delivery of health services: research methods. London: Routledge; 2001.
25. Gilson L. Health Policy and Systems Research. A Methodology Reader.
Geneva: Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research & World Health
Organization; 2012.
26. Ridde V. “The problem of the worst-off is dealt with after all other issues”:
the equity and health policy implementation gap in Burkina Faso. Soc Sci
Med. 2008;66:1368–78.
27. Walt G, Shiffman J, Schneider H, Murray SF, Brugha R, Gilson L. “Doing”
health policy analysis: methodological and conceptual reflections and
challenges. Health Policy Plan. 2008;23:308–17.
28. Bertone MP, Lagarde M, Witter S. Performance-Based Financing in the
context of the complex remuneration of health workers: findings from a
mixed-method study in rural Sierra Leone. BMC Health Serv Res.
2016;16:286.
29. Bhatnagar A, George AS. Motivating health workers up to a limit: partial
effects of performance-based financing on working environments in
Nigeria. Heal Policy Plan . 2016;31(7):868–77. Advanced Access.
30. Ogundeji YK, Jackson C, Sheldon T, Olubajo O, Ihebuzor N. Pay for
performance in Nigeria: the influence of context and implementation on
results. Heal Policy Plan. 2016;31(8):955–63. Advanced Access.
31. PBF Community of Practice. Coût de La Vérification Communautaire Au
Burkina Faso - Cost of Community Verification in Burkina Faso; 2015. Available
at https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/performance-based-financing/
WqLGPsJcn4Y.
32. Falisse J-B, Meessen B, Ndayishimiye J, Bossuyt M. Community participation
and voice mechanisms under performance-based financing schemes in
Burundi. Trop Med Int Heal. 2012;17:674–82.
33. Naimoli JF, Vergeer P. Verification at a Glance. A Series of Snapshots of
Experiences in Verifying Performance Linked to Financial Incentives for
Results-Based Financing (RBF) Programs from Selected Countries.
Washington, DC: World Bank; 2010.
34. Vergeer P, Hashemi T, Sabignoso M, Basenya O, Mugeni C, Vushoma E,
Sisimayi C: Verification of Results. Findings and Recommendations from a
Cross-Case Analysis. World Bank - presentation at the Annual Results and
Impact Evaluation Workshop for RBF; 2014.
35. Lagarde M, Wright M, Nossiter J, Mays N. Challenges of payment-for-
performance in health care and Other Public Services – Design,
Implementation and Evaluation. London: London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine - Policy Innovation Research Unit; 2013.
36. Deaton A. Randomization in the Tropics, and the Search for the Elusive Keys
to Economic Development. NBER Working Paper No. 14690; 2009.
Antony et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2017) 17:204 Page 12 of 12
